Local fiscal policy is highly affected by choices made at the state level, through legislative, executive, and judicial action. State laws, including the state constitution, provide the framework within which municipalities develop and implement fiscal policies. It is tempting to think of states as establishing these frameworks for other-regarding purposes, that is, for the purpose of establishing a system of efficient and equitable system of intrastate public finance. While everyone concedes that their judgments about efficiency and equity may frequently be wrong, the general theoretical assumption in much of the academic discussion of public finance is that states act benevolently with regard to fiscal decisionmaking.
If we think about state policymakers very differently, however, our theories of state/local fiscal decisionmaking must be reconsidered. States, I suggest, develop fiscal frameworks with an eye toward increasing their own political advantage. The contents of these advantage-seeking include the usual sort of rent-seeking behavior of legislators acting within the structure of state politics; they also include the choices made by states to compete against one another in the national market for economic gain. The ubiquity of self-interested behavior on the part of state decisionmakers is well known in standard public choice accounts, of course (Macey, 1988 ). Yet the insights from public choice and "positive political theory" accounts of state political behavior have not been applied in any systematic way to questions concerning state and local fiscal policymaking (see Farber & Frickey, 1992) . The function of this essay is to suggest some lines of future inquiry for scholars interested in probing this question of state and local competition for fiscal advantage.
Competition between State and Local Governments: A Theoretical Overview
The competition among legislators for political influence and control is a standard element of the public choice account of legislative decisionmaking. Since it is assumed that all legislators seek rents through various political machinations and strategies, it follows that the legislative arena is a place for both collaboration and competition in the pursuit of rational self-interest (Weingast & Marshall, 1988) .
In order to fuel these private-regarding strategies, policymakers will endeavor to create institutions and processes which facilitate their agendas. For example, the creation of legislative committees and the corresponding rules which govern committee decisionmaking can be viewed as mechanisms to fuel legislative sent-reeking (Shepsle, 1979) . Committee processes raise the costs substantially of efforts to dismantle legislative bargains, thus ensuring that legislative deals are more durable. Moreover, committee processes can specially empower certain legislators who are concerned with protecting and augmenting their own political power within the legislature. The positive political theory account of legislative behavior and structure stresses the ways in which rational legislators design their institutions to enhance their individual power (Rodriguez, 1994) .
There is another dimension to their power-enhancing strategies as well. Legislators succeed in furthering their objectives only insofar as other competing policymakers do not weaken the institutional frameworks within which legislators pursue their strategies. The legislature, then, competes against other institutions-such as the executive branch-for power and influence. For example, Richard Posner and William Landes describe how Congress works to control courts' statutory interpretations in order to decrease the likelihood that these interpretations will have the effect of unraveling the bargains struck between legislators and interest groups (Landes & Posner, 1975) . In a similar vein, Jonathan Macey points out that if we, as a normative matter, wish to decrease the prevalence of private-regarding legislation, we ought to "help out" the courts by interpreting otherwise hortatory public regarding language in statutes to mean what it says (Macey, 1986) . These, and related, analyses highlight the point that legislative advantage-taking relies not only on the strategizing of legislators within the legislature, but it also relies on the legislators strategizing on behalf of their institution within the larger political process.
Let us turn to the relationship between state and local governments. In order to ensure that their interests will be promoted in the political process, state decisionmakers-and particularly legislators-will compete vigorously with local governments for rents of different sorts. For example, policies which require substantial expenditures to carry out their objectives will depend upon tax strategies implemented by the relevant political institution. Supposing that there is a point at which firms will flee from one jurisdiction to another because it is overtaxed, then it makes a significant difference from both the perspective of state as well as local governments whether both levels government can assess a certain tax or, instead, that authority is limited to one level of government. The lesson drawn 2 Which does not mean, of course, that local governments do not benefit greatly from whatever amount of revenue the state government provides to local governments through the appropriation process.
5 from the positive political theory of government is that neither the state nor the local government will be at all agnostic concerning the fundamental legal question whether one or both levels of government have the power to tax (Rodriguez, 1996) .
There is a particular dilemma for local governments in developing their strategies for competition with the state government in the taxation area. Although local governments do not usually depend upon the state legislature for adequate revenues to carry out municipal functions, 2 local governments are highly dependent upon the state legislature for legal authority to raise revenues at the local level through taxation. Localities have to compete, therefore, mostly through their skillful use of state-sanctioned authority. Less commonly, they rely upon express legal protections.
In the main, the state legislature has a heavy stick over localities: It can, at least in principle, restrict the scope of municipal power to tax. Although the incentives to do so are there, there remain a complex series of legal rules and principles which regulate state interventions. In the balance of this essay, I briefly describe one of the key elements of the state/local legal framework, municipal home rule, an element which bears directly and significantly on local taxing authority.
State Prerogatives, Local Constraints
The legal relationship between state and loc al governments is based upon the fundamental principle of state supremacy and local subordination (Gillette & Baker, 1999) . Unlike the national constitution which, as a document of grant, provides that all power not delegated to the federal government is reserved to the states, state constitutions typically reserve powers to the state government so that the state legislative and executive branches can act unless the state constitution restricts their power (Frug, 1980) . In other words, state constitutions are documents of limits.
Moreover, local governments are regarded as "creature[s] of the legislature, from which, within constitutional limits, it derives all its rights and powers" (Munro, 1923 commuter taxes, wage taxes, individual income taxes, and hotel taxes. As a practical matter, however, local governments are restricted in these choices. Indeed, the percentage of local taxes raised through devices other than the property tax and taxes and gross receipts has hovered between 10 and 15% over the past forty years (Holcombe & Sobel, 1997) .
From the standpoint of intrastate gross domestic product, it does not matter, of course, whether revenues are raised locally or at the level of the state. However, the distributional consequences of the decision to devolve fiscal powers to local governments, to share powers with such governments, or to centralize fiscal decisionmaking are predictably immense. By restricting the domain of choice available to local governments, states shift both resources and, critically, legal power away from municipalities (the local) and toward the state (the center).
This is not the place to provide a fuller account of the normative significance of this shift (see Rodriguez, 1999) . Suffice it to say that the fiscal shift away from local discretion and toward more centralized control has tremendous consequences for American public policy. Rather, my observation in this essay is a more narrow one: This shift is not solely, or even especially, the product of a series of informed, public-regarding decisions made by policymakers to create a wise, efficient system of intrastate public finance. It is fundamentally a product of strategic choices by state policymakers to augment their ability to control local governments through the power of the purse.
As an illustration of this phenomenon, consider the struggle in California over the proper scope of local authority to impose business license taxes on corporations doing business within a city. Until the end of the 1970's, California tax law provided that municipalities could tax savings and loan organizations (most charter cities did so), but provided an "offset" whereby savings & loans could claim a credit against their net state tax liability for taxes paid to municipalities. This offset scheme insured that savings & loans would not be subjected to any greater net tax liability than similarly situated commercial banks. In 1979, the California legislature abolished the offset system and declared that the so-called "in lieu" feature of the net income tax, formerly applicable only to commercial banks, would now extend to financial corporations. As a result, all commercial banks and savings & loan organizations were now to be subject to a single state-imposed income tax and no other tax.
Naturally, municipalities worried that this change would result in a substantial decrease in local revenues. Initially, the California legislature attempted to solve this problem by creating, through statute, is, what is the scope of municipalities' home rule powers within the structure of the state constitution? It is accurate to say that home rule creates the framework within local governments can compete with state governments for fiscal authority. And, naturally, since revenue production at the local level is tied squarely to fiscal authority, the importance of this framework-is substantial.
Why is home rule important? Specifically, what is the impact of one or another form of home rule protection on localities' taxing authority?
Municipal Home Rule and the Dynamics of State and Local Power
Home rule in state constitutions follows two very different models. The first model is often described as imperium in imperio. The idea is that the authority given to local governments in the state constitution is to act without the need for express legislative authorization (this is the "enabling" function of home rule) and, moreover, the power to act without fear of legislative preemption (this is the "protective" function of home rule). This latter power derives from the grant of constitutional authority-what might be described as a sort of constitutional "right"-to act with full sovereignty so long as these actions are carried out in the area of "municipal affairs" (Gillette & Baker, 1999) .
From the standpoint of state and local relations, this model upends the traditional subordination of local power to state control, at least in the domain of "municipal affairs." This is an especially important reconfiguration of state/local power in the area of tax policy. In the California Federal S & L case, for example, the issue before the court was whether local governments ought to have full power to impose business license taxes notwithstanding competing state tax decisions and notwithstanding the strong interest on the part of the state government not to have localities imposing these taxes. As one might expect, many of the key cases involving the interpretation of "municipal affairs" in those states which follow an imperium in imperio model of home rule concern local taxation policy.
The other model of municipal home rule is often described as the National League of Cities (NLC) model, a reference to a law revision project undertaken by NLC in order to develop a model home rule statute. The NLC model establishes home rule powers for localities in state statutes, not in the constitution. Although there is an acknowledgment of the localities' authority to act without the need for express legislative authority in the area of "municipal affairs," the fact that local power is protected only by a statute means that there is no protection against legislative preemption. Home rule power, then, is entirely dependent upon the state's decisions to refrain from preempting or otherwise disrupting local initiatives. By contrast to the first model described above, the NLC model of municipal home rule does not substantially reconfigure the power relationship between state and local governments (see generally Krane, Rigos, & Hill, Jr., 2001 ).
If we cared only about the law "on the books," then we might be in a position to claim that local tax policy is greatly protected in those states which follow an imperium in imperio system of home rule and weakly protected in those states which follow the NLC model. When we turn to law "in action,"
however, we see that the issue is considerably more complicated. To begin with, the scope of "municipal affairs" is defined by state courts and, therefore, the scope of local home rule protection is subject to all of the difficulties of constitutional interpretation of ambiguous language (Rodriguez, 1995) .
What, after all, does "municipal affairs" mean as a legal concept?
The essential difficulty with municipal home rule of the NLC variety is that it subjects local taxing power to the decisions of the state legislature. It is the state that gets to decide what is the scope of local home rule power under the structure of NLC-type home rule. And the essential difficulty with imperium in imperio home rule is that it subjects local taxing power to the decisions of state courts, courts which are responsible for defining the phrase "municipal affairs." These difficulties are not equivalent, however. If the analysis of the state legislature's incentives vis-a-vis local governments is accurate, we can expect that the discretion accorded to state decisionmakers to define the scope of municipal home rule is a recipe for weakened local authority.
The relationship between imperium in imperio home rule and the scope of localities' tax authority is more complex. Surely the authority given localities' to tax in the area of "municipal affairs"
without the fear of state preemption is a significant aid to local power. On its face, it flips the traditional power relationship by giving bargaining power, through the existence of a legal immunity or "right," to municipalities. Yet, this bargaining power is only as substantial as the scope of what are "municipal affairs." On the whole, state courts have been rather reluctant to regard local taxing decisions as generally shielded from state control because they are intrinsically municipal affairs. Instead, state courts have struggled to accommodate localities' interest in augmenting local revenues through strategic tax policies while also accommodating the state's interests in a rational, comprehensive tax system.
The principal point of this short essay, however, is that the state's judgment about what is rational and comprehensive and, therefore, what falls under the rubric of "matters of statewide concern," ought to call for rather strict scrutiny. State legislators have an incentive to regulate local taxing decisions since these localities, through these decisions, can thereby compete with state legislators for political influence, control, and power. This is not to suggest that such competition represents the only worry on the part of state government. Surely there must be substantial discretion accorded to central decisionmakers-namely, the state legislature-to establish a system of state taxation.
Yet, the incentives of state legislators to act purposively and, in particular, with an eye toward protecting their institutional prerogatives from encroachment by local governments, suggests that state decisions to preempt local taxing authority should be viewed skeptically.
We return to the issue of municipal home rule. Home rule authority can perform the function of preserving a realm of local discretion in a legal environment in which the state legislative and executive branches have virtually all of the fundamental constitutional powers. How significant is the shift from state to local power accomplished by home rule depends, first, upon the type of home rule (imperium in imperio versus NLC) power accorded to local governments and, second, the extent to which courts are prepared to construed "municipal affairs" in a way which preserves and protects local taxing authority from state preemption.
In the end, our sense of the proper role of municipal home rule in state/local relations may depend not only on our general and particular normative assessments of local decisionmaking in the tax area but also, as I have suggested, on our positive analysis of state and local institutions and political behavior. Characterizing state and local policymakers in the ways suggested by modern public choice and positive political theories points to some interesting, and potentially fruitful, lines of future research on questions of tax policy, legal doctrine, and political economy.
